

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X (Advance Cy Saturday)		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OCA				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	D/Ex Staff				
17	C/ACIS		X		
18	D/SOVA/DI		X		
19					
20	ER		X		
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		Date _____			

Remarks

Executive Secretary
22 Jun 87

Date

3637 (10-81)

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Executive Registry

87-2278X

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

June 19, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: My Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dubinin

Dubinin visited me at his request on Monday, allowing me to stress a few points appropriate in the immediate aftermath of Venice and Reykjavik and just prior to Dubinin's return to Moscow for an important Central Committee Plenum.

I told Dubinin we intended to stand firmly with Kohl on exclusion of the FRG's Pershing's and their warheads from the INF agreement. I said these systems were of little military importance, but that keeping cooperative nuclear systems out of bilateral agreements was very important to us politically. We were puzzled as to why this issue had suddenly been raised by the Soviets after the Shultz-Shevardnadze talks of April, and hoped they would revert to their previous position.

Dubinin said that the FRG's Pershing missiles were not the issue, but US warheads on them were. The FRG can hardly claim ownership of US warheads. (A recent Karpov article states the Soviet argument: The Non-Proliferation Treaty forbids the Germans from possession of nuclear weapons; the INF agreement will stipulate zero US and Soviet warheads on SRINF missiles, of which Pershing IA is an example; hence the US warheads have to go. I suspect we'll be playing hardball on this one for a while.)

On the Persian Gulf, I stressed that we shared an interest in ending the Iran-Iraq war and seemed agreed that freedom of navigation be safeguarded. I urged the Soviets to both support our UNSC resolution that called for sanctions against the intransigent side in the war, and to work to halt arms sales to Iran by the USSR's allies.

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Declassify on: OADR

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Dubinina said the Soviet side supported an effective UNSC resolution. He noted recent Soviet leadership statements that supported an end to the war, diffusion of tensions, respect for the sovereignty of coastal states, exclusion of foreign bases, safeguarding of navigation, a conference on the Indian Ocean, and creating an Indian Ocean "zone of peace." (In other words, they are all over the map in search of political and propaganda advantage.)

I closed the conversation stressing, once again, the importance of the USSR's recognizing the impossibility of peace in Afghanistan based on a communist-dominated government and of stopping attacks on Pakistan. Dubinina called our attention to a declaration of the Kabul regime that it was now "really" ready to share power with "outside" elements (e.g., cooperative resistance groups and the former king).

Two subjects Dubinina raised on his own were: a) the late-May Warsaw Pact proposal for a NATO-Pact consultation on military doctrine; and b) the Soviet proposal to Shultz that the SCC meet at the level of defense ministers to discuss what is and isn't permitted by the ABM Treaty. I told him we would listen to anything further the Soviets wanted to tell us about the doctrine proposal, but were skeptical about the second proposal because of its clear purpose to inject constraints into the ABM Treaty which we do not believe are now in it.



Frank C. Carlucci

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